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In The genesis of syntactic complexity, Talmy Givón develops a multidisciplinary approach to the ori-
gins of human language in general and the rise of syntactic complexity in particular. By weaving to-
gether insights in language change, language acquisition, the structure of pidgins, the structure of 
aphasiac speech, the neurology of language processing, animal communication and cognition, biologi-
cal evolution and human prehistory, a scenario is formulated of how syntactic complexity could have 
plausibly developed.  
 Syntactic complexity is understood as the imposition of hierarchic organization on communica-
tive content. This covers the syntactic bundling of information in simple clauses but also the creation 
of recursive structures through embedding. It is especially recursive syntactic structures that dominate 
the discussion, with a specific focus on the emergence of clause embedding in VPs (complementation) 
and in NPs (relativization).  
 The reason for the focus on recursive structures is that recursivity has been given pride of place 
as the hallmark of the human language capacity by Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002). These authors 
have argued that the evolution of a capacity for recursion is precisely what has set human communica-
tion apart from animal communication. At the same time, they have suggested that the computational 
mechanism for recursion may have arisen independently of adaptive pressures on communication, 
implying also that the core properties of syntax may have been moulded by other than communicative 
needs. The genesis of syntactic complexity takes issue with this view, arguing that the uniqueness of 
human communication is misrepresented if it is reduced to recursivity, and that the syntactic character 
of human language can in fact be explained as having arisen under the pressures of online communica-
tive demands. 
 The first half of the following discussion presents an outline of the argumentation in The genesis 
of syntactic complexity. Because the argument is complex and very much interwoven, I do not strictly 
present it chapter-by-chapter but rather highlight the main ideas and how they build up to the general 
claims. The second half of this review is devoted to a critical evaluation, pointing out what I see as the 
work‟s main contributions to the existing literature as well as some potential weaknesses.  
 A central argument for the view developed in The genesis of syntactic complexity comes from a 
consideration of the emergence of clause embedding in the two well-documented developmental 
trends in language – i.e. language change and language acquisition. In both, it is argued, syntactic 
clause embedding develops from earlier paratactic structures. For example, in language history, com-
plex serial verb constructions are often found to have been assembled from a chained two-clause para-
tactic precursor, by merging the clauses intonationally and semantically first and with (potential) re-
duction of verbal morphology on one of the erstwhile independent verbs later. In (1), for instance, a 
one-time chained construction has been merged into a single causative clause (quoted from p.80): 
 (1)  Supyire (OV; Carlson 1994): 
  mii à  u  karima à  ngukuu lyi 
  I  PERF him force  PERF chicken eat 
  „I forced him to eat the chicken‟ 
  (Hist.: „I forced him and he ate the chicken‟) 
 
As another example, in language acquisition, the emergence of relative clauses is typically accompa-
nied by a stage of referential negotiations across conversational turns or over multiple intonation units, 
as in (2) (quoted from p.233):  
 
(2)  MOTHER:  What‟s this? 
  NINA:   A little ducky. Swimming in the water.  
 
 The recurrent development from paratactic to syntactic structures in language change and lan-
guage acquisition opens the door to further inferences. A similar trajectory from paratactic to syntactic 
could be extrapolated for the emergence of syntax in language evolution. From this, it follows that if 
one can understand the communicative gain of the syntactic mode of expression over its paratactic 
precursor, this can also help pin down the communicative-adaptive factors underlying the rise of syn-
tax within the broader context of human evolution.  
 Considering the paratactic-to-syntactic shift more closely, then, there is evidence of its function-
ally-driven nature, both in language change and in language acquisition. In language change, it is 
found that the typological diversity in clause embedding strategies is determined to a considerable 
extent by diversity in the source constructions from which clause embedding can develop. For exam-
ple, a highly nominalizing language can recruit its relative clauses from appositionally used nominali-
zations as in (3a), from Ute (quoted from p.107). By contrast, a finite language will more likely recruit 
them via clause chains as in (3b), from Bambara, where min is a demonstrative reinterpreted as rela-
tive marker (quoted from p.98). Inevitably, the outcomes, though functionally alike, will be structur-
ally different.  
 
(3) a. tʉpʉy-ch, ‟uru  mamach-i  tʉkan‟na-pʉ-vwan  wacʉ-ka-n(a), ... 
  rock/SUBJ that/OBJ woman-GEN  table-OBJ-on    put-PERF-NOM 
  „the rock, that one that the woman put on the table, ...‟ 
  (Hist.: „the rock, that of the woman‟s putting on the table, ...‟) 
 b. n ye  o  ye,  cɛ  min ye  muru san. 
  I PAST him see man REL PAST knife buy 
  „I saw him, the man who bought the knife.‟ 
  (Hist.: „I saw him, that man bought the knife‟) 
 
Yet once the differences in diachronic pathways are factored out, it is possible to see also what is con-
stant. Apart from the tendency for clause-embedding to arise from paratactic precursors, as again illus-
trated in (3), the constant element is the function the historical source constructions fulfil in discourse. 
Typically, the function of a new syntactic pattern is foreshadowed as a pragmatic effect of its historical 
source. Thus, the precursors of relative clauses in (3) already aid referential identification. Similarly, 
verbal predicates that get involved in clause union, as in (1) above, regardless of the diachronic path-
way, tend to belong to a relatively small group of lexical items with general communicatively central 
meanings, again suggesting a functionally constant starting point for change.  
 One implication is that the transition from parataxis to clause-embedding involves the syntactic 
codification of some specific discourse function. This is achieved by recruiting patterns from online 
communication and devoting them specifically to a particular function. Another implication is that 
universals in language reside not so much in the typological diversity of structures, but in the func-
tional underpinnings of the diachronic pathways that lead to diversity.  
 In language acquisition, too, the emergence of clause-embedding is functionally-driven, its ap-
pearance being in step with changes in the child‟s communicative ecology. Specifically, one type of 
clause-embedding (complex verb phrases) develops well before another (relative clauses), because 
they answer to different communicative needs that manifest themselves at different points in a child‟s 
development. Complex verb phrases are acquired in the context of early child communication, which 
is still highly context-dependent and dominated by manipulative speech acts and one-clause turns. The 
main communicative goal at this stage is getting things done in the here and now. Early complex verb 
phrases, accordingly, are mostly used to mark direct manipulative speech acts, as illustrated by let me 
give and wanna give in (4) (quoted from p. 154).  
 
(4)  NINA:   Yeah, let me give that to Poy now. I want...  (request) 
  MOTHER: What do you want to do?        (solicitation) 
  NINA:   I wanna give that to Poy now.      (request) 
 
Relative clauses, by contrast, arise only as the increase in displaced reference and declarative speech-
acts and the rise of multipropositional discourse call for increasingly sophisticated means for referen-
tial tracking. It is, in other words, a shift in the child‟s communicative ecology that makes restrictive 
nominal modification worth acquiring.  
 The evidence of language change and language acquisition reveals functional motivations for 
the development of syntax. In this context, it is interesting to consider the specific functions syntax 
fulfils. These can mostly be characterized as ways of coding the speaker‟s representation of the 
hearer‟s deontic and epistemic state of mind as it evolves during communication. To stick with the by-
now familiar examples, this includes the speaker‟s conception of the referential accessibility of dis-
course participants to the hearer (which relative clauses can serve to manipulate), as well as the 
speaker‟s conception of the hearer‟s deontic and epistimic attitudes towards propositions (which can 
be tracked by means of complex verb phrases). Syntax, then, is largely devoted to encoding „theory of 
mind‟ operations.  
 The reasons why syntax is particularly good at this can be gleaned from early child language, 
pidgin communication and the discourse of Broca‟s aphasia patients. All three forms of communica-
tion involve some form of „creative regression‟ in the sense that they cannot depend on morphosyntax. 
The result is communication that, while not being unorganized, depends much more heavily on con-
textual inferencing, is thereby harder to process, slower and more error-prone. Moreover, hierarchi-
cally organised chunking, which is what syntax offers to the language user, is argued to be also what 
makes expert performers fluent at their tasks in other cognitive domains – dancing, playing music, 
typing, reading, etc. Chunking complex sequential information into hierarchically organised schemata 
contributes to increased automaticity, eases retrieval and thus decreases attentional demands. In other 
words, syntax offers a way of reducing the processing burden of communication, both by speeding up 
processing and by eliminating some costly and error-prone context-dependent inferencing.  
 Against this background of what syntax does for communication, it is possible to begin to ad-
dress the question of how the rise of syntax would have fitted into the evolution of language. The evo-
lution of language in general must be linked to an „information explosion‟ in human evolution that 
boosted the need for communication. Experimental evidence shows that the cognitive capacity of pre-
human animals clearly surpasses their communicative code. Primates have a rich mental lexicon and 
can represent events and even event sequences. Neurological evidence confirms this by indicating that 
the brain circuits relied on for semantic and episodic representation have pre-linguistic precursors in 
the visual-information processing trends in primates. Only, primates do not or hardly code their mental 
representations. The trigger for the rise of language, then, must have been primarily a communicative 
need rather than a cognitive need.  
 A clearer understanding of how communicative needs could have changed can be gathered from 
what animals do communicate about. Among higher primates, most information is shared. Both ge-
neric information (territory, social structure) and episodic information (the events of daily life) are 
known across the group and usually no group member avails of additional adaptively valuable declara-
tive information. What gets communicated are deontic signals about the immediate context. This cul-
tural and communicative ecology resembles that of young children, and primate communication is 
accordingly reminiscent of children‟s early language use in being deontic, monopropositional and 
extremely context-dependent. Informational stability gets disrupted only if information imbalances 
arise between group members. Contextual factors that could have brought this about in the course of 
human evolution are a drastically expanded foraging range, an increase in group size, and an acceler-
ated rate of cultural change involving within-group informational specialization. Down the causal 
chain, various further (and presumably correlated) factors could have contributed to this, including 
tool-making, bipedalism, big-game hunting etc. 
 Taken together, the above suggests a scenario for the genesis of language and (complex) syntax. 
Currently attested communicative behaviour among primates – deontic and context-dependent – 
serves as a plausible starting point. A developmental analogue is provided by language acquisition, 
which shows a similar coupling of increasing linguistic complexity to an expanding communicative 
ecology. Growing information imbalances in an increasingly complex social setting would be the driv-
ing force for the successive emergence of a coded lexicon, one-word declarative speech-acts, pre-
grammatical word combinations and multipropositional discourse. With the advent of multiproposi-
tional discourse comes the need for greater processing efficiency, for the reduction of context-
dependence, and for ways to monitor and guide the addressee‟s state of mind as it changes during dis-
course – that is, the need for syntax. Note here that the evolutionary recency of syntax is consistent 
with its absence in animal communication, even under training, as well as with neurological findings 
indicating that syntactic processing is highly distributed and does not yet rely on exclusively dedicated 
modules. Known developments in diachrony, finally, provide the concrete mechanisms to arrive at 
syntactic complexity, as they present a picture of how syntactic structures are derived from paratactic 
precursors under functional pressures in online behaviour.  
 To see what Talmy Givón‟s The genesis of syntactic complexity contributes to the current un-
derstanding of language evolution, it is convenient to position it with respect to Hauser, Chomsky and 
Fitch (2002), against which it is an explicit reaction. Recall that Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002) 
suggest that recursivity sets human language apart from any other communication system in nature but 
(paradoxically) arose outside the adaptive context of communication. Though keeping many details 
rather vague, Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002) link this suggestion to the claim that most aspects of 
human language have some equivalent in animal communication systems, except recursivity. The  
reasoning then is that its conspicuous absence in animal communication not only makes recursivity 
unique to human communication, but also adds plausibility to the idea that recursivity would have 
“evolved for reasons other than language” (2002: 1578). A further consequence of this view is that the 
structural details of syntax, of which recursivity is the assumed core component, might not be adapted 
to communication, being “by-products of preexisting constraints rather than end products of a history 
of natural selection” (2002: 1574).  
 On its most explicit level, The genesis of syntactic complexity challenges this thesis by arguing 
that syntactic recursivity is itself the “by-product” (p.240, 338). The usefulness of syntax is claimed to 
lie in its capacity to perform theory of mind operations in a less context-dependent and maximally 
efficient way. It is not recursivity per se, then, that forms the great adaptive benefit syntax has to offer. 
This is especially apparent in clause union. Diachronically, following clause union, recursivity often 
disappears again, as one of the erstwhile verb phrases gets reduced to an operator and eventually ends 
up as morphological marking on the remaining verb. In ontology, the more grammaticalized state in 
which one verb functions as operator on the other appears to be the prime acquisitional target. In that 
light, the availability for structures allowing explicit clause-embedding only falls out of the need for 
devices that let the speaker monitor and direct the hearer‟s deontic and epistemic attitudes. Whether or 
not those devices involve recursivity is really beside the point.  
 As I interpret it, the strongest support for this argument is in the many examples Givón offers, 
all demonstrating the same point. On the one hand, as far as meaning is concerned, recursivity is there 
in pregrammatical communication, albeit in paratactic, unencoded and context-dependent form. I be-
lieve this shows clearly enough that to communicate an endless variety of thoughts no syntactic recur-
sivity is needed. On the other, diachrony demonstrates that when „pragmatic‟ recursivity, which is 
present also in ordinary usage, gets syntactically encoded, it is not for the sake of recursivity as such, 
but because recursivity can be exploited for some particular discourse function. Recursive representa-
tion no doubt has its role and place in the cognitive development of the human species, but it is neither 
the climax of linguistic development nor what syntax is all about.  
 Less explicitly, The genesis of syntactic complexity also eats away at the plausibility of Hauser, 
Chomsky and Fitch‟s (2002) proposal by taking on its implications. First, an argument is mounted 
against the possibility that structural features could be communicatively a-functional, which would 
have been implied had they been selected for under other than communicative pressures. In principle, 
the emergence of structural features is a functionally-driven diachronic (rather than evolutionary) 
process linked to communicative needs in online discourse. What arbitrariness there is arises from the 
“overlaying of adaptively-driven changes in temporal order”, which can lead to “considerable restruc-
turing and arbitrary-seeming structure-function pairing, thus to seemingly non-adaptive relic features” 
(p.316). Still, note here that the point is perhaps not as straightforward as it seems. User-optimality is, 
also in Givón‟s view, partly determined by how language is processed, hence by biologically imposed 
constraints, yet these constraints are not seen to be specific to a faculty of language, nor is it claimed 
that the effect they have on language structure renders language a-functional in some respects. Rather, 
language structure is conceived of as an optimally adapted response to what our brains can handle.   
 Second, if certain structural features in language are the outcome of evolution and neurological 
implementation, as suggested by Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002), they must be hard-wired and 
universal. Here, too, The genesis of syntactic complexity takes a different view on language universals, 
arguing that what is universal are not extant features but the diachronic processes that give rise to 
them. The many examples provided make a convincing case for the existence of these processes and 
their effect on synchronic structural diversity. Of course, no amount of positive evidence can prove the 
absence of hard-wired features with some structural manifestation in the grammars of the world (even 
if the task of finding them seems, by now, daunting). What makes Givón‟s alternative attractive on 
this point is that it makes fewer presuppositions, explaining extant language structure through proc-
esses that can be seen at work today. This is in line with Heine and Kuteva‟s premise that “a hypothe-
sis on language evolution that is not in accordance with observations on change in modern languages 
is less plausible than one that is” (2007: 16).  
 It should be added that this uniformitarian approach is somewhat more precarious than it may 
appear. In fact, we know that at some point in evolution cognitive capacities must have changed, so we 
know that uniformitarianism just cannot hold all the way through – only we do not know for certain 
how far back uniformitarianism can be stretched. Givón, like Heine and Kuteva (2007), chooses to see 
the rise of syntax primarily as a diachronic phenomenon, falling out of the behaviour of modern lan-
guage users. Given our current state of knowledge on syntax and language processing, a convincing 
case is made that such a model could suffice to explain the rise of the structures attested in the world‟s 
languages. So it is preferable as the simplest explanation, even if it still requires some leap of faith. 
 Finally, The genesis of syntactic complexity fills in some of the details that Hauser, Chomsky 
and Fitch (2002) leave open, and weaves these into a coherent scenario. With the paratactic-to-
syntactic shift, a diachronic mechanism is proposed that can explain the emergence of concrete syntac-
tic structures where before there are none – a point on which Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002) have 
remained silent altogether. Being embedded in grammaticalization theory, the paratactic-to-syntactic 
mechanism is more realistic than scenarios deriving structure from holistic proto-clauses (as proposed 
by Wray 1998), which in any case face several other problems (Tallerman 2007). Givón‟s proposal 
resembles scenarios outlined by Jackendoff (1999) and Bickerton (2003), who likewise claim that 
complexity arises through combination of elements, but it supplies more detail. Although its impor-
tance may be overemphasised (see below), the paratactic-to-syntactic shift is at least a concrete proc-
ess for recruiting syntactic structure for discourse from discourse. Its applicability, moreover, may 
extend beyond recursivity/complex syntax, as is suggested by the fact that general iconic principles of 
pre-grammatical communication (e.g. ellipsis, ordering, proximity) likewise tend to have surviving 
codified correlates in grammar (p.244).  
 Next to a diachronic mechanism, a relatively concrete evolutionary scenario is provided that 
does not fail to single out specific adaptive pressures and that, in doing so, contextualizes the rise of 
language in the evolution of the human species, and the rise of syntax within the development of lan-
guage. In several ways, the scenario has advantages over earlier proposals. For one, the information 
explosion and subsequent in-group information imbalance seems more plausible as the core adaptive 
pressure than Dunbar‟s (1993) proposal, holding that language developed to maintain social bonding 
at a time when grooming became ineffective due to increasing group sizes. Givón‟s argument that 
early language must have been primarily deontic is convincing and precludes early language from 
serving an important social bonding function comparable to present-day small talk. Moreover, it is 
hard to conceive how small talk would have been subserved by the effortful, highly context-dependent 
and probably partly gestural communication of pregrammar that must have preceded human language 
as we know it today. For another, in line with the normal gradualness of evolution, The genesis of syn-
tactic complexity posits no drastic biological changes. It is suggested that, to the extent that neurologi-
cal structures must arise to accommodate language processing, this happens by minimal stepwise 
changes, co-opting pre-existing modules. Again, it is safer to make assumptions maximally concordant 
with the majority of known evolutionary processes.  
 On the whole, then, The genesis of syntactic complexity manages to deliver a coherent scenario 
for the evolution of language and the emergence of syntactic complexity, going into surprising detail. I 
believe it is the detail, on the one hand, and the cogency of the overall argument, on the other, that in 
the end gives the work its force. A convincing case is made to argue what syntax is really for, taking 
into account an impressive range of evidence, and the consequences of this are spelled out into a con-
sistent and specific model of the origins of syntax. Despite the justified concerns voiced by Slobin 
(2002) regarding the dangers of extrapolating from language acquisition and diachrony to language 
evolution, Givón largely – but perhaps not completely (see below) – succeeds in making the best of 
the available data, singling out what is relevant in the two well-documented developmental trends, and 
bringing this to bear on the evolutionary puzzle. In all these respects, The genesis of syntactic com-
plexity is definitely a step forward.  
 That said, the book is not entirely without its weaknesses. In some cases this is because the cru-
cial evidence is still missing or underexplored; in others it is because existing evidence is, I believe, 
overstretched or interpreted one-sidedly. For example, what is clearly still missing is a more explicit 
integration of the evolutionary model outlined in The genesis of syntactic complexity with the (inevita-
bly patchy) archaeological record. Similarly, though probably less hard to supply, the claim that syn-
tax makes communication easier to process is not fully backed up by psycholinguistic evidence. 
Givón‟s criticism on psycholinguistic research, much of which has aimed to demonstrate that syntactic 
complexity correlates positively with processing difficulty, is certainly original and probably to some 
extent justified. It seems quite possible that a complex syntactic structure will actually be easier to 
process than a simpler alternative, provided it is used in the kind of communicative context to which it 
has been diachronically tailored. For now, however, as Givón must recognize (p.288), the experimen-
tal evidence is more or less missing.  
 In this context, it should further be pointed out that the precise impact of chunking, automation 
and hierarchic organization on processing is still to be worked out in more detail. For instance, it re-
mains unclear whether automation and hierarchic organization benefit processing in the same way for 
speaker and hearer. More seriously, the comparison of language with other domains of expert per-
formance, while no doubt instructive, will eventually need to be spelt out with much more precision. 
For example, the hierarchic organization that aids chess performance, to which Givón draws explicit 
analogies (p.287), actually pertains to organization of information (particular chess board constella-
tions) in long-term memory (Gobet 2005), so whether this is directly comparable to the hierarchic 
organization in syntax, where it is the linguistic output itself that is hierarchically structured, is doubt-
ful. One could choose here to understand hierarchic organization as the organization of linguistic tem-
plates into „construction networks‟, as in the usage-based tradition (e.g. Langacker 1987), but clearly 
that is not the hierarchic organization Givón has in mind when he first introduces the notion by linking 
it to sentence-level tree structures (p.4–6).  
 A very different problem area is the paratactic-to-syntactic shift, of which I believe The genesis 
of syntactic complexity tends to exaggerate the explanatory potential, both in language acquisition and 
in language change. With respect to language acquisition, Givón, in defending the paratactic-to-
syntactic shift, argues against the acquisitional pathway for clause-embedding outlined by Diessel and 
Tomasello (2001). The latter maintain that children acquire complement constructions first as simple 
propositions in which the „main‟ verb functions as a modal operator, while truly embedded comple-
ment clauses develop out of these precursors only at a later stage. So children start with holistically 
acquired chunks (I think, guess what, see, etc.) that only afterwards get analyzed for what they are in 
the adult input. This violates the paratactic-to-syntactic shift, and with it the idea that complexity aris-
es through synthesis rather than analysis. Even so, I think it poses no major problem to Givón‟s overall 
argumentation, since the main points are unaffected (i.e. the use of context-dependent unencoded 
means as a first step in the acquisition of grammatical equivalents; and the resemblance between child 
and primate communication and communicative ecology). The fact that child language converges on 
an existing model makes the process of language acquisition different enough from language change 
and language evolution (Slobin 2002) to expect and explain such discrepancies. Yet, Givón goes to 
great lengths to counter Diessel and Tomasello‟s (2001) view, making a number of less convincing 
claims along the way.  
 On the one hand, Givón submits that the first holistic chunks children produce have paratactic 
precursors, not just as functional equivalents but as the uses out of which later syntactic uses develop. 
These are mainly to be found in the dyadic interaction between parent and child, in which parent and 
child jointly construe modal or referential meaning. An example is (5) (from p.160), where the parent 
supplies a modal operator, after the child has supplied various chunks of the full proposition. The child 
can acquire the use of the operator by „merging‟ (p.231) its own utterance with that of the adult.  
 
(5)  NINA:  The cookie for Poy.      (request) 
  MOTHER: Do you want to give Poy a cookie?  (offer) 
 
That these jointly construed modalized propositions form the precursor to modal marking in the 
child‟s own usage is an intriguing possibility – though one that is hard to prove, as Givón admits 
(p.161), and presupposes a special merging mechanism. However, supposing this view is correct, it 
would still drastically redefine the paratactic-to-syntactic shift, since it does not involve automation of 
frequently co-occurring adjacent patterns, nor is there any continuity between the source structure and 
a superficially identical structure with a new underlying analysis. So, the major parallelism with dia-
chrony is lost anyway.  
 On the other, Givón downplays the importance of the subsequent step whereby holistically ac-
quired chunks are analyzed into embedded structures, claiming (on p.169) that: 
 
 There is no independent syntactic evidence that the two stages [...] differ syntactically in any 
demonstrable way.  
 
But in fact there seems to be some evidence that adults and children differ in the structural status they 
assign to complement-taking verbs, as shown by Givón‟s example of overgeneralization in child usage 
in (6) (quoted from p.153).  
 
(6)  NINA:  I forgot [to put] some more sticks in this, in this ...  (PAST) 
     Two sticks wanna go in this truck.       (request) 
 
On the whole, then, the evidence for the synthetic/combinatorial pathway to grammatical complexity 
in language acquisition may have been overstated.  
 Regarding language change, The genesis of syntactic complexity describes a number of different 
diachronic pathways leading to clause-union and relativization. Convincing evidence is presented that 
both clause-union and relativization can arise out of paratactic sources. However, it is repeatedly sug-
gested that these are the only or at least the most important pathways to clause-union. In the chapter on 
clause-union, Givón speaks of “the two main diachronic pathways through which complex verb phras-
es [...] may arise” (p.61, italics added). In the chapter on relative clauses, announcement is made of “a 
more comprehensive typology of the diachronic pathways that give rise to REL-clauses”, which is 
claimed to generalize over an earlier typology of relative clauses that had yielded “7–8 major syn-
chronic types” (p.96, italics added). One is left with the impression that nearly all embedded clauses 
have some paratactic precursor.  
 However, another major source of embedded clauses is the reanalysis and expansion of deverbal 
derivations (Disterheft 1981). A well-described example is the history of the English gerund, which 
began as a deverbal nominalization in -ing/ung with nominal syntax, as in (7a) but developed into a 
clause, as in (7b). As the distribution of gerunds remained modeled on that of noun phrases, this 
process resulted in the appearance of gerunds as complement clauses to numerous transitive verbs, as 
in (7c). By now, some of these new verb-complement combinations display early signs of developing 
into auxiliary-verb combinations, as in (7d), where look like marks subjective speaker expectation 
(rather than objective resemblance). This last stage of the development is familiar enough, yet at no 
point has a paratactic source been involved in the preceding history. 
 
(7) a. ðurh ðæra sacerda blawunge toburston ða wealles. (c1000, Visser 1963–73: 1156) 
  „Through the blowing of the priests, the walls broke down.‟ 
 b. Whiche Vine the Foxes sometimes spoyle and endamage by robbyng the fruite. (1579, 
OED) 
  „Foxes sometimes spoil and damage this vine by robbing the fruit.‟ 
 c. That ladies who intend dancing minuets do wear lappets. (1787, OED) 
 d. I.B.M. already has 80 per cent of the world computer market. With its micro-modules it 
looks like keeping it. (1968, OED) 
 
 Some of Givón‟s own examples may actually be better explained as having arisen through anal-
ogy. For instance, the Mandarin relativisation structure in (8a) (discussed by Givón on p.112–114) is 
in fact analogous to the nominal reference point construction in (8b). Seeing this parallelism, given the 
very permeable nature of the verb-noun distinction in Mandarin, and given that both the relative clause 
construction and the reference point construction aid identification of a nominal referent, a historical 
connection between the two structures in (8) is entirely plausible. No paratactic precursor is needed to 
explain the relative clause structure: simple reinterpretation of a nominal as a clausal slot would have 
done the job.  
 
(8) a. jīntiān yíng de    rén   yùnqì  hǎo (Li and Thompson 1981: 581) 
  today   win  NOM  person  luck   good 
  The people who won today had good luck 
 b. tùzi  de  ěrduō  (Li and Thompson 1981: 113) 
  rabbit  GEN ear 
  (a) rabbit‟s ear 
 
From this it appears that The genesis of syntactic complexity has to some extent been selective in the 
diachronic pathways it highlights, focusing too exclusively on changes with a paratactic source and 
perhaps even occasionally forcing other types of change into this mould.  
 This has consequences for the overall argument. In light of the purely paratactic nature of pre-
grammatical modes of communication (in children, pidgin speakers, aphasia patients), and assuming 
that these can be compared to an early mode of human communication, the very first steps in the 
emergence of grammar are likely to have involved recruitment of syntactic patterns from paratactic 
sources, but once language had some structure (say, simple clauses, word class distinctions), the rules 
of the game would have been transformed and much more diverse analogy-based pathways of change 
would have become possible (see e.g. De Smet 2009 on the emergence of new syntactic structure 
through analogy). For the genesis of complex syntax, The genesis of syntactic complexity presents the 
paratactic-to-syntactic shift as the sole pathway to clause-embedding, but fails to motivate this less-
than-obvious choice.  
 Despite these points of concern, The genesis of syntactic complexity is an exciting and challeng-
ing book that succeeds in developing a detailed and consistent framework for interpreting the evolu-
tion of human language and the place of syntax in this development. It contains several original ideas 
and the way these are linked in with the evidence from a wide range of different research disciplines is 
definitely impressive. Bearing on a very general and fundamental issue, but bringing to it the insights 
from various very specific subfields, the book can be expected to leave few linguists unmoved. Most 
importantly, perhaps, it holds out the exciting promise of integrating linguistics with what its author 
sees as the true mother discipline of the study of mind and behaviour, biology. 
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